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“It was the bravest who moved first over the big sea. Those who stayed, the sluggish and thoughtful, 
called them adventurers.”      Vilhelm Moberg, The Emigrants, 1951. 
 
“Immigration must be halted in the short-term so that our dole queues are not added to by, in many 
cases, unskilled migrants not fluent in the English language.” 
        Pauline Hanson, Australian Politician 
   
1. Introduction 
Immigrants, defined as people born in another country than they reside in, constitute a large 
fraction of total populations across countries. In 2005, immigrants accounted for 10.3 percent 
of domestic populations in the average country, and more than 20% in over 30 countries.* †  
The inflow of immigrants has triggered substantial debate about migration policy in many 
developed countries, and also raised questions welfare state design in the presence of in-
migration. Sinn (2002) and Peterson and Rom (1990) argue that immigration constitutes a 
flight towards safety, especially when host countries are endowed with generous welfare 
states. Under this welfare magnet hypothesis (Borjas, 1999) immigration endangers the long-
term sustainability of the welfare state, as immigrants will impose a heavy burden on social 
insurance schemes. This idea stands in stark contrast with the notion of the skilled and risk-
taking immigrant that self-selects into migration – as described by the Moberg quote above 
(and  also  by  Chiswick,  1999).  According  to  the  self-selection  hypothesis,  immigrants  are  a 
                                                       
* Source: World Development Indicators, Immigrant Stock World Bank (2007). 
† The share of immigrants world-wide has been roughly constant over the latest decades, but the 
migrant stock tends to be increasing in developed countries and decreasing in less developed 
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selected, less risk averse and competitive subsample of their home country population, and 
thus not primarily interested in the generous welfare state offered by their hosting country. 
In this paper, we use a large set of nationally representative surveys to investigate the nature 
of  immigration  and  immigrants’  attitudes  towards  redistribution.  Combining  data  from 
multiple waves of the world value survey, we analyze both the socioeconomic characteristics 
of the average immigrant, and also use the responses to two broad welfare state questions to 
investigate their redistributive preferences. Our results provide little support for the welfare 
state magnet hypothesis and appear consistent with the hypothesis of self-selection. First 
generation immigrants typically prefer less redistribution compared to non-immigrants in 
the  country  where  they  reside,  while  their  children  (second  generation  immigrants)  are 
almost identical to their peers. Our results speak strongly against immigration leading to an 
expansion  of  the  welfare  state:  if  anything,  the  political  impact  from  immigrants  on  the 
welfare state is towards convergence: In countries with small, residual welfare states, first 
generation immigrants prefer a larger role for government in providing for all, while in the 
Nordic universal welfare states, immigrants are significantly less leaning towards income 
inequality compared to non-immigrants in these countries. However, these differences do 
not transmit to the next generation. 
Several scholars have examined the impact of immigration on the political preferences of 
natives. In theoretical political economy models, results often suggest that immigration leads 
to lower welfare state support among non-immigrants as immigrants often end up claiming 
welfare benefits. For example, Mayr (2007) shows that there is a case for natives to oppose 
immigrant voting out of redistributive concerns. Similarly Razin et al. (2002) notes that as the 
number of migrants grows, more tax revenue ends up in the hands of low-skill migrants,   4/21 
causing the native-born tax payers to prefer lower taxes. The conclusion is supported by data 
on 11 European 1974–1992, indicating that a higher share of low-education immigrants in the 
population leads to a lower tax rate on labor income and less generous social transfers.* 
Among recent empirical evidence, Eger (2009) finds that more new immigrants decreases 
welfare state support in Swedish counties. On the other hand, Senik et al. (2009) study 22 
European  countries  using  the  European  social  survey  and  find  only  weak  evidence  of  a 
negative association between the perceived presence of immigrants and natives’ support for 
the  welfare  state.†  Tamura  (2006)  notes  that  immigration  should  theoretically  cause 
disagreement among natives, and notes that this idea is supported by Dustmann and Preston 
(2004) who show that low-income earners and those who face unemployment risk are less in 
favor of immigration in the UK. Finally, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) argue that ethnically 
more diverse communities display lower degree of trust, and thus generally demand lower 
levels of redistribution. 
Much fewer studies focus on the preferences of immigrants themselves. Studying Germany 
and Great Britain,  Dacnygier and Saunders (2006) show that once income is controlled for, 
immigrants are very similar to natives in their support for increased social spending and 
redistributive measures.  Finally,  using  a  survey  of foreign born immigrants  in  Germany, 
Bonin and coauthors (2006) conclude that “first-generation immigrants are more  risk averse 
                                                       
* A similar, although more complex model appears in Dolmas and Huffman (2004), who note that 
natives' preferences over immigration are influenced by the prospect that immigrants will be voting 
over future tax policy. 
† Unsurprisingly, the effect is bigger for natives who dislike immigrants and also are concerned about 
the economic consequences of immigration.   5/21 
than natives, while in the second generation risk preferences appear to equalize” (p. 1).* This 
study extends the existing literature to a larger, and more heterogeneous, set of countries, 
allowing an individual level analysis against a range of host country settings.  
The paper is structured as follows: we describe the data and the empirical strategy chosen in 
section 2, and present the results in section 3. We conclude with a short summary in section 
4.  
2. Data and empirical strategy 
2.1. Data 
The data used in this study are from the World Value Survey (WVS). The World Values 
Survey is the result of an international collaboration to collect data on socio-cultural and 
political  change.  Starting  in  1981  with  the  European  Value  Surveys  (EVS),  the  WVS  has 
grown  rapidly  to  cover  more  than  80  countries  around  the  globe  by  2007.†  Surveys  are 
conducted by local investigators, and designed to be nationally representative. As of today, 5 
waves of the survey were collected: 1981, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, with a growing, but 
changing set of countries across waves.  
The WVS contains a large set of questions regarding values and attitudes, two of which are 
the primary focus of this paper. First, the surveys contain a question regarding inequality. 
The question asked is the following: 
                                                       
* The measure used is the stated "willingness to take risks, in general" on a 0 to 10 scale, for a sample of 
21 000 adults. 
† A full description of the history of the WVS as well as the data files is available online at 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.   6/21 
“How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on 
the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall 
somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between:   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Incomes should be 
made more equal
We need larger income 
differences as incentives for 
individual effort
 
As Figure 1 shows, the distribution of answers across the 10 categories is relatively evenly 
spread, with slightly more probability mass on the right hand side. The median score is 6, 
indicating that the sample median would prefer to have slightly higher income differentials. 
While this question has been used as proxy for redistributive preferences by for example 
Blekesaune (2007) and Meier Jæger (2007),  the link to redistribution is not obvious because 
the  question  is  about  inequality.  The  assumption  that  the  welfare  state  redistributes  to 
change  the  distribution  is  to  some  degree  implicit  in  the  framing;  one  might  argue  that 
individuals that want incomes to be more equal would like to have a more redistributive 
welfare state.    7/21 














0 2 4 6 8 10
Need larger income differences
 
Source: World Values Surveys, wave 5  
 
On the other hand, one could argue that the question is directly about the progressivity of 
the tax system; individuals indicating a preference for larger income differentials may want 
the same amount of social transfers, but a less steep tax schedule to encourage work and 
entrepreneurship. To deal with this issue, we also analyze a second question featured in the 
WVS. Following the same agree/disagree setting from before, the two options are: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The government should take 
more responsibility to ensure 
that everyone is provided for
Individuals should take more 




This question was recently analyzed by Koster (2008), who argues that the answers reflect a 
preference  over  economic  individualism  versus  social  equality.  As  Figure  2  shows,  the   8/21 
distribution of the answers to this question is slightly more tilted towards the left. The most 
common answer is 1 (19.5%), followed by 5 (14.8%), the latter of which is also the median 
response.  The  correlation  between  answers  to  the  two  questions  is  a  moderate  at  0.18, 
highlighting the different dimensions of the welfare state addressed by the two questions.  
In the group of respondents answering 1 on the government question, 29% also have a score 
of  1  on  the  inequality  question,  but  a  26%  indicate  that  larger  income  differentials  are 
needed. The desire for more government provision does thus not necessarily imply a desire 
for  less  income  inequality,  and  the  same  is  true  the  other  way  around:  a  desire  for  less 
inequality does not necessarily imply a desire for more government. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of answers: ”Individuals should take more responsibility for 
















0 2 4 6 8 10
Individuals should take more responsibility
 
Source: World Values Surveys, wave 5  
 
While the questions regarding inequality and government size were asked in each survey, 
immigration was addressed only in 3 of the 5 survey waves. In waves 2 and 3 (1990 and   9/21 
1995) respondents were asked about their country of birth. In wave 5, respondents were 
asked  about  the  birth  place  of  their  parents.  Using  these  two  questions,  we  divide  our 
analysis in two parts. In the first part, we analyze the first generation immigrants, that is, the 
respondents in the 1990 and 1995 surveys that indicated to be born in a foreign country. As 
summarized in Table 1 below, we have 48,634 observations in this sample, spread over 42 
countries in 5 continents.* On average, 6.3% of respondents indicate to be immigrants. 
For the country of birth, the WVS collected regional information as summarized in Figure 3 
below. In the full sample, a remarkably high fraction of 47% indicates to have European 
origins, followed by Asia (26%). The fraction of immigrants from Africa and Latin America is 
rather small. Since we have a highly diverse group of countries in our sample, we put special 
emphasis on three sub-groups in our sample: (1) the original OECD members as high income 
migration  countries  (2)  the  group  of  countries  with  universal  welfare  states  (Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark) and (3) the group of countries with residual (also known as marginal or 
targeted) welfare states (US, Australia, New Zealand in our sample). The classification of 
countries into different welfare state types vary in the literature, but according to Bambra 
(2007), some countries should be considered to be more core to certain regime types than 
other; undoubtedly, Nordic countries and the US have very different types of welfare states. 
To  simplify,  we  can  interpret  the  two  categories  to  mean  big  and  small  welfare  state 
respectively. 
As Figure 3 shows, the composition of immigrants varies substantially across groups. While 
European immigrants are the largest group in all three subsets of countries, only 33% of 
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immigrants indicated to be of European origin in the residual welfare group, while the same 
is true for 57% in the universal welfare state countries in our sample. 




As to the other socio-economic characteristics, immigrants are actually rather similar to the 
domestic  population.  On  average,  immigrants  are  better  educated  and  earning  higher 
income than non-immigrants. They are also slightly older and have fewer children.  
As  to  the  two  main  variables  of  interest  –  attitudes  towards  income  inequality  and 
government  size  –  first  generation  immigrants  seem  to  differ  significantly  from  the 
domestically  born  population.  On  average,  immigrants  indicate  to  want  more  income   11/21 
inequality, but at the same time also larger governments, a point we shall address in more 
detail in the following section. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the first generation immigrants 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 40.93 15.69 46.22 16.01
Female 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50
Number of children 1.84 1.64 1.71 1.33
Married 0.61 0.49 0.63 0.48
Educational attainment 4.65 2.20 5.21 2.16
Self-employed 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.21
Unemployed 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26
Student 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20
Retired 0.14 0.35 0.22 0.42
Income decile 4.39 2.57 4.84 2.72
Perceived Social Class 1.68 0.95 1.69 0.89
Incomes need to be more equal 4.20 2.99 3.91 2.78






In the second part of the paper we use data from the wave 5 of the WVS. In wave 5 (collected 
from 2005 to 2007), respondents were no longer asked about their birth place, but, instead 
about  the  birth  place  of  their  parents.  As  shown  in  Table  2,  about  4.5%  of  the  wave  5 
respondents indicate that both parents were born in a foreign country. Second generation 
immigrants are overall very similar to the first generation, with slightly higher educational 
attainment and higher incomes than the domestically born population.     12/21 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Second generation immigrants 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 42.33 14.73 42.10 15.23
Female 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.50
Number of children 1.86 1.66 1.64 1.60
Married 0.61 0.49 0.54 0.50
Educational attainment 5.46 2.48 5.73 2.39
Self-employed 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38
Unemployed 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17
Student 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15
Retired 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30
Cognitive job 4.73 3.11 5.21 3.10
Income decile 4.86 2.17 5.20 2.22
Perceived Social Class 2.68 0.96 2.87 0.97
Incomes need to be more equal 4.96 2.85 5.20 2.85







2.2. Empirical Specification 
To investigate the net differences between immigrants and non-immigrant populations, we 
use  a  standard  multivariate  regression  model,  with  our  two  measures  of  redistributive 
preferences as dependent variables. The main estimated equation looks as follows: 
ij ij ij j ij redistribution immigrant X α β γ δ ε = + + + +       (1) 
where  ij redistribution  is respondent i’s expressed attitude towards redistribution in survey j, 
immigrant  is  an  indicator  for  first  or  second  generation  immigrant,  and  X  is  a  matrix  of 
individual  socioeconomic  characteristics.  We  control  for  age,  gender,  education,  income, 
perceived social class and employment status in all of our specifications. To control for year 
and country specific factors determining average redistributive preferences at the time of the 
interview, we include survey (country-year) fixed effects  j δ  in all of our specification.    13/21 
3. Results 
3.1. First Generation Immigrants 
Table 4  and 5  show our  main  results for  first  generation  immigrants.  Table  4  shows  the 
(unconditional) mean differences in redistributive preferences between immigrants and non-
immigrants. The main patterns emerging from the table go strongly against the commonly 
perceived notion of immigrants being particularly vulnerable and thus demanding in terms 
of welfare state, or immigrants actually being attracted by the welfare state – as found by 
Borjas (1999) analyzing immigrants with the US only. On average, immigrants agree to a 
lesser degree that incomes should be made more equal. In the full sample, as well as among 
OECD-countries only, immigrants are less prone to think that incomes should be more equal. 
The difference is about 0.3 units on the scale from 1 to 10. In the universal welfare states the 
difference is much higher (almost 0.8) but in residual welfare states, immigrants are actually 
slightly more egalitarian. As to the attitudes towards government size, the picture is more 
mixed; on average, immigrants want slightly larger governments, an effect which is largest 
in the countries with residual welfare states. 
In  Table  5,  we  estimate  equation  (1)  to  investigate  whether  the  differences  between 
immigrant and non-immigrant population remain when controlling for the socio-economic 
characteristics  of  respondents.  Given  the  negative  correlation  between  income  related 
variables  such  as education  and  perceived  social class  and  redistributive preferences,  we 
expect smaller differences in the multivariate setting, which is what we find in Table 5. Once 
we condition on all available socioeconomic variables, the differences between immigrant 
and non-immigrant population drops from -0.3 to -0.1 for the full sample, and from -0.8 to -
0.5  in  the  universal  welfare  state  sample;  this  later  difference  is  significant  at  the  99%   14/21 
confidence level.  The relative magnitude of the “immigrant  effect” is comparable to a  5-
decile shift in income, or a one step increase in social class in the universal welfare state 
group.  In residual welfare states, the sign is the opposite but without significance. 
 
Turning to the question regarding the role of government in providing for all, there is no 
significant  difference  between  immigrants  and  non-immigrants  in  the  full  sample. 
Interestingly,  among  OECD  countries  and  residual  welfare  states,  first  generation 
immigrants prefer a slightly bigger role for the government compared to non-immigrants in 
these countries. However, the same is not true for the universal welfare states, where the 
estimated differences are not significant.  
 
Most other control variables have the expected sign, with employment status, income and 
(self-perceived)  social  class  as  big  influencers  on  redistributive  preferences.  Overall,  the 
immigrant effect for first generation is small, and goes against the standard welfare-magnet 
hypothesis:  Immigrants  in  universal  welfare  state  want  less  redistribution,  whereas 
immigrants in residual welfare states prefer a larger role for the government, which implies 
that immigration will lead to a convergence in redistributive preferences across countries. 
 
Table 3: Welfare state attitudes among first generation immigrants compared to non-
immigrants (unconditional means) 
Want more.. equality  government equality  government equality  government
Full Sample 4.20 6.29 3.91 6.42 -0.29 0.12
OECD 4.79 5.11 4.56 4.97 -0.23 -0.14
Universal Welfare State 4.88 4.84 4.10 4.47 -0.77 -0.36
Residual Welfare State 4.50 4.54 4.57 5.11 0.08 0.57
Non-immigrants Immigrants Difference
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Table 4:  Multivariate Analysis: Welfare state attitudes among first generation immigrants 
compared to non-immigrants  
     
Dependent 
variable  Incomes should be more equal  Government should take more 
responsibility 
                 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Sample  Full  OECD  Universal  Residual  Full  OECD  Universal  Residual 
                 
Immigrant  -0.09*  -0.04  -0.52***  0.12  0.08  0.21**  -0.21  0.36*** 
  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.19)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.22)  (0.12) 
Age  0.00*  0.00  -0.01**  -0.00  0.00***  -0.01***  -0.02***  -0.02*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Female  0.14***  0.28***  0.30***  0.44***  0.15***  0.07  0.24***  0.02 
  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Education  -0.10***  -0.05***  -0.08***  -0.02  -0.06***  -0.02  0.06**  -0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Self-employed  -0.25***  -0.32***  -0.36*  -0.10  -0.14***  0.04  -0.33*  -0.22 
  (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.19)  (0.25)  (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.20)  (0.25) 
Unemployed  0.19***  0.42***  0.31*  0.06  0.23***  0.50***  0.34*  0.47* 
  (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.18)  (0.24)  (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.18)  (0.24) 
Student  0.09  0.13  0.15  0.25  0.04  0.15  0.19  0.53** 
  (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.18)  (0.24)  (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.19)  (0.26) 
Retired  0.19***  0.23**  0.07  0.26*  0.14***  0.36***  0.36**  0.22 
  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.18)  (0.15) 
Married  -0.03  -0.04  -0.03  -0.04  -0.07**  -0.07  -0.06  -0.18* 
  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Children  0.01  -0.00  0.12***  -0.03  0.01  0.05**  0.10**  -0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Income decile   -0.08***  -0.06***  -0.11***  -0.08***  -0.05***  -0.04***  -0.08***  -0.10*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Self-perceived 
social class 
-0.25***  -0.36***  -0.47***  -0.20***  -0.22***  -0.25***  -0.30***  -0.16*** 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Constant  5.39***  5.18***  6.04***  5.52***  8.19***  7.45***  4.87***  6.74*** 
  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.24)  (0.23) 
                 
Observations  48634  11048  2564  3837  48634  11048  2564  3837 
R-squared  0.109  0.061  0.191  0.031  0.137  0.132  0.135  0.076 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
3.2 Second generation immigrants 
Tables 5 and 6 show our main results for second generation immigrants. As described in the 
previous section, the data used in this part was collected in the latest round of the WVS 
(wave 5). Given that these data were collected after 2005, and the average immigrant in the 
wave 2 and 3 had immigrated about 10 years prior to the interview, the respondents of wave 
5  can  loosely  be  considered  the  second  generation  of  those  immigrants  analyzed  in  the 
previous section.  As shown in the appendix, there are fewer countries in wave 5; there are   16/21 
only two countries with universal welfare states (Sweden and Finland) and there is only one 
country from the residual welfare state group, Australia. 
 
As illustrated in the descriptive statistics in Table 2, second generation immigrants are fairly 
similar to respondents with domestic parents. Second generation immigrants, just like their 
first generation parents, have on average higher income and are more highly educated than 
the rest of the population. They also now have a higher self-perceived social class. The 2005 
questionnaire also contains a question about whether the current job requires more manual 
(1) or cognitive (10) skills, a question on which second generation immigrants answer on 
average 0.5 points higher. 
 
As  Table 5  shows,  the  overall picture regarding  the  relative redistributive  preferences of 
second generation immigrants is mixed. On average, second generation immigrants want 
more equality, and slightly less government, but the signs of the differences vary between 
different  sub-samples.    Table  6  shows  that  the  differences  actually  get  slightly  more 
pronounced once we control for socioeconomic factors. Conditional on socioeconomic status, 
second generation immigrants are more favorable to inequality in OECD countries, while the 
same is no longer true in the Nordic universal welfare state countries, which is opposite to 
what we find in the first generation immigrant section.  
 
As  to  the  preferences  regarding  government  size,  we  cannot  detect  any  significant 
differences between respondents with domestically born, and respondents with foreign born 
parents.  These  results  suggest  that  the  transmission  of  welfare  state  preferences  across 
generations  is  limited,  and  that  local  norms  and  perceptions  are  adapted  rather  rapidly 
across generations.   17/21 
Table 5: Welfare state attitudes among first generation immigrants compared to non-
immigrants (unconditional means)  
Want more.. equality  government equality  government equality  government
Full Sample 4.96 6.03 5.20 5.95 0.24 -0.08
OECD 5.83 5.89 5.55 5.53 -0.28 -0.37
Universal Welfare State 5.23 4.65 5.24 4.93 0.00 0.28
Australia 5.39 5.12 4.89 5.26 -0.50 0.14
Non-immigrant parents Immigrant parents Difference
 
 
Table 6:  Multivariate Analysis: Welfare state attitudes among second generation 
immigrants compared to non-immigrants   
     
Dependent variable  Incomes should be more equal  Government should take more responsibility 
                 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Sample  Full  OECD  Universal  Australia  Full  OECD  Universal  Australia 
                 
Immigrant parents  -0.02  -0.33***  0.38  -0.39**  0.04  -0.06  0.37  0.09 
  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.42)  (0.19)  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.37)  (0.19) 
Age  0.00**  0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.00  -0.01***  -0.00  -0.02*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Female  0.14***  0.28***  0.29**  0.40***  0.13***  0.11*  0.22*  -0.28* 
  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.15) 
Education  -0.05***  0.01  -0.05  0.09*  -0.02***  -0.01  0.05  0.12** 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
Self-employed  -0.02  -0.19**  -0.57**  -0.66***  -0.14***  -0.41***  -0.66**  -0.90*** 
  (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.27)  (0.22)  (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.28)  (0.24) 
Unemployed  0.02  0.03  0.84  0.58  0.03  0.09  0.22  0.89 
  (0.08)  (0.15)  (0.72)  (0.53)  (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.57)  (0.60) 
Student  -0.29**  -0.10  0.30  0.19  0.20*  -0.11  -0.29  0.19 
  (0.12)  (0.20)  (0.40)  (0.63)  (0.12)  (0.20)  (0.42)  (0.42) 
Retired  -0.07  0.03  -0.60**  0.36  0.03  0.06  -0.49*  -0.06 
  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.26)  (0.26) 
Married  -0.06  -0.11*  -0.06  -0.30*  0.00  -0.08  -0.01  0.06 
  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.15)  (0.17) 
Children  -0.03***  -0.00  -0.05  -0.09  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.09 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Income decile   -0.10***  -0.11***  -0.15***  -0.05  -0.11***  -0.09***  -0.13***  -0.17*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Self-perceived  class  -0.14***  -0.30***  -0.46***  -0.40***  -0.10***  -0.24***  -0.19**  -0.19* 
  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.09)  (0.11) 
Cognitive skill job  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03  -0.06*  -0.04***  -0.01  -0.00  0.03 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Constant  7.31***  7.62***  8.21***  6.18***  7.57***  8.10***  5.97***  7.18*** 
  (0.12)  (0.18)  (0.38)  (0.51)  (0.13)  (0.19)  (0.38)  (0.54) 
                 
Observations  32382  8091  1251  1178  32382  8091  1251  1178 
R-squared  0.132  0.158  0.161  0.082  0.099  0.135  0.056  0.087 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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5. Concluding discussion 
Immigration flows across countries remain high, with more than a million people leaving 
countries like Mexico, India and China each year to seek their fortune abroad. The continued 
inflow of migrants has spurred a heated migration policy debate in many OECD countries, 
in which immigrants are – as in our second opening quote – often portrayed as poor and 
uneducated individuals entering rich countries to profit from their generous welfare states.  
In  this  paper  we  have  shown  that  this  notion  is  incorrect.  We  have  used  nationally 
representative  survey  data  to  show  that  the  average  immigrant  is  neither  poor,  nor 
uneducated, but, on the contrary, actually slightly better off than the average respondent in 
the  hosting  country.  Furthermore,  even  when  controlling  for  several  socioeconomic 
variables, immigrants are not particularly favorable to redistribution and larger government 
responsibility. On the contrary, our results suggest that immigrants and their descendants 
have  either  similar  preferences  or  are  slightly  less  supportive  of  redistribution  than  the 
domestically born population.   
Our  results  cast  doubt  on  the  empirical  relevance  of  some  theoretical  political  economy 
models such as Mayr (2007) and Razin et al. (2002), where immigrants are assumed to be 
pro-redistribution  welfare  beneficiaries.  More  importantly,  our  results  imply  that  anti-
immigration policy for the sake of protecting the welfare state from current abuse or future 
growth is ill-founded, and likely to reflect specific political agendas rather than empirical 
evidence. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Country List - First generation immigrants 
Country Name Sample Country Name Sample
Argentina 759 New Zealand 712
Armenia 1,572 Nigeria 1,486
Australia 1,341 Norway 903
Azerbaijan 1,537 Pakistan 660
belarus 1,472 Peru 912
Brazil 1,071 Puerto Rico 950
Bsnia and Herzegovina 948 Republic of Moldova 844
Bulgaria 742 Romania 1,106
Chile 885 Russia 1,639
China 1,334 Serbia and Montenegro 1,280
Czech Republic 840 Slovakia 856
Dominican Republic 306 South Africa 2,215
Estonia 680 spain 792
Finland 776 sweden 758
Georgia 1,798 Switzerland 792
Germany 1,396 Taiwan 628
India 1,215 Turkey 1,487
Latvia 875 Ukraine 1,693
Lithuania 805 United States 1,190
Macedonia 567 Uruguay 860
Mexico 1,842 Venezuela 999
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Table A2: Country list: Second generation immigrants 
Country  Observations Country Observations
Andorra 905 Morocco 841
Australia 1,178 Peru 857
Brazil 670 Poland 374
Bulgaria 392 Romania 584
Burkina Faso 384 Rwanda 798
Chile 716 South Africa 1,712
China 1,207 South Korea 1,187
Cyprus 583 Serbia 562
East Germany 902 Slovenia 733
Egypt 1,051 Spain 936
Ethiopia 640 Sweden 796
Finland 455 Switzerland 1,008
Ghana 812 Taiwan 1,128
India 1,175 Thailand 1,373
Indonesia 939 Trinidad and Tobago 510
Italy 494 Turkey 729
Japan 819 Ukraine 509
Malaysia 802 Vietnam 1,347
Mali 281 West Germany 774
Moldova 855 Zambia 364
 
 
 
 
 